We criticize the irresponsible conduct of the authorities, who put political calculation ahead of protecting human life by actively disclosing the identities of refugee North Korean defectors.
In a “briefing on the group defection” on the 8th, the Ministry of Unification announced that “one male manager and twelve female employees, who had been dispatched by North Korea to work at an overseas restaurant, arrived in Seoul on April 7.” It relayed their motive for defecting, saying that “while living abroad they came to know the reality of South Korea and the falseness of North Korean regime propaganda and decided to defect as a group,” and even released a photograph in which they wore masks.
Following this unusual government announcement, reports and commentary have followed. One said that “the Ministry of Unification objected, citing the practice of not disclosing defections for the safety of defectors and the families they left behind in the North, but was ignored” [Hankyoreh, 11 April 2016, “The Blue House ordered the ‘urgent announcement of the group defection’”]. Another said that “Japanese media such as the Tokyo Shimbun and the Nihon Keizai Shimbun continue to report that such active disclosure is a South Korean government election strategy” [Kyunghyang Shinmun, 12 April 2016, “Japanese media also report that ‘the disclosure of the defection of North Korean high-ranking officials is a South Korean government election strategy’”]. Criticism also continues from many quarters asking whether the government made a political calculation by putting the defectors’ lives at stake.
Until now, the government has maintained a “non-disclosure principle” on the grounds of personal safety, which must be provided to refugee defectors as the first priority. It has not disclosed the fact of entry during the entry process or before and after entry, and has asked the media that covered the matter not to report it. In fact, in 2006, in a complaint filed by a defector whose personal details were disclosed to the press during the joint interrogation process, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) found that the disclosure violated Article 7 (Application for Protection, etc.) of the Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from North Korea and the Guidelines on the Handling of Defectors Passing Through Land, Sea and Air Routes, and infringed human rights under Article 10 (human dignity) and Article 17 (freedom of privacy) of the Constitution, among others. It recommended that measures be prepared to prevent the recurrence of the same or similar cases.
From the standpoint of third countries, North Korean defectors are clearly refugees under international law such as the Refugee Convention. Each country strictly prohibits the disclosure not only of personal information about refugees but even of the very fact that a refugee has applied for asylum in a particular country [“Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures – Global Consultations on International Protection, EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001, paragraph 50 (m)”, “EU COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2005/85/E,C”, “U.S. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) and 1208.6(a)”, “UNHCR Procedural Standards for RSD under UNHCR’s Mandate 2.1.1.”, etc.]. Although North Korean defectors are not refugees under the Refugee Act in the Republic of Korea, Article 17, paragraph 1 of Korea’s Refugee Act likewise prohibits, without the person’s consent, the disclosure of personal details, photographs and the like that make it possible to identify an asylum seeker, prohibits the disclosure and leaking of information, and sets out penalty provisions.
The information that a person applied for asylum to escape persecution by the country of nationality must be kept strictly confidential, because it would not only chill all activities related to North Korean defectors in China and block the defection routes passing through China and other countries, but also pose serious danger to the refugee defectors concerned. If such information that makes it possible to identify the persons concerned is leaked and the home government learns of it, it is obvious that the families and other related persons remaining in the home country will be subjected to persecution such as investigation and punishment. We cannot know whether the government’s active briefing this time, which included photographs, went through the lawful consent of the defectors concerned. Even so, it is self-evident that the briefing itself enabled the North Korean authorities to infer the identities of the refugee defectors. For the government, which should protect refugees, to take the lead in actively disclosing detailed information to the press is not only highly unusual in content, procedure and timing, but also dangerous.
When a reporter asked at that day’s briefing why the information was disclosed in such an unusual way, the spokesperson answered lamely, “It was disclosed because it is a rather peculiar case in which North Koreans defected as a group.” Does a peculiar case mean that the danger to human life may be ignored? Organizations in Korea that advocate for refugees strongly oppose every attempt by the authorities to use for political purposes the confidential asylum requests of vulnerable refugees who need protection and solidarity. We urge that those responsible, who arbitrarily disclosed the information without any legal basis or justification, be held accountable; that measures be prepared, including compensation, for the irreparable damage that has surely been caused to the refugees concerned and their families; and that the “non-disclosure principle” be actively observed to prevent a recurrence of similar cases.
공익법센터 어필, 공익인권법재단 공감, 난민인권센터, 드림, 아시아평화를향한이주(MAP), 피난처